Presumably the server profile. I'd say phone-->B1 the sbc is a server. A1-->SM the SBC is the client.
I'd imagine the CRL is literally just the entirety of the pems -----BEGIN CERT HERE------- asdjwjfiwejierjo ------END CERT HERE--------- cat'ed into 1 big file.
Here's an absolutely ridiculous idea. Change the SCEP profile of the phone to use serial number instead of MAC, or vice-versa. Maybe the SBC is categorically stupid and considers and CN= in a cert in a CRL to make the SBC reject that CN.
As in, you can't issue a cert to CN=9611SERIAL123456, then revoke it, then issue another to the same CN despite it being a different certificate.
That's not how CRLs should work at all. But with the SBC and certs...nothing would surprise me.
Open a case and traceSBC the TLS handshake once you know your phone has a new cert that isn't in the CRL...
Last thought: maybe the phone's cert issued via SCEP is lazy and has the CA cert+ the phone cert to provide the validation chain. Maybe by "revoking" the phone's cert you inadvertently "revoked" the whole chain including the CA for any other phone that has a cert signed by the same CA. It's the only way I could think of where it's "working as designed" and you did "something wrong". I guess the test would be use SCEP to get a cert from some other CA and try again for 2 phones.
Or, look at the CRL. Sometimes people do something like this:
Basically, to have the CA cert and the device cert people will "cat ca.cert signed.cert >phone.cert" and by revoking "phone.cert" you inadvertently revoked "ca.cert" for everyone who has a cert signed by that CA.
I'm just guessing. but check your CRL - if you find the CA cert in there anywhere, you have your answer
