The problem with electronic voting is that all the steps needed to protect a vote from being tampered with also need to protect the anonymity of the voter. This is a tough problem -- how you determine that someone is who they say they are, but then allow them to cast an anonymous vote?
With the paper-based systems (optical-mark recognition, punch-cards, etc), this was easy, as you gave each voter a ballot that had no personally identifyable information on it. They then cast their vote (permanently altered the ballot in some way) and fed it to the ballot box to be tallied.
The trouble is, with an electronic system, how do you (the voter) make sure your electronic ballot correctly reflects your choices? They're just bits in a memory circuit -- you can't just look at it and tell that your vote was recorded correctly. The electronic tally software could be tampered with (or in the case of the Diebold system, just have been badly written) to cast everyone's vote for Buchannan. ;-)
If we as a country do decide to continue experimenting with electronic voting, I would like to see :
[ul][li]Source code publically available for inspection[/li]
[li]Something like Nevada's Gaming Board to inspect machines[/li]
[li]Sealed machines and EPROMs (no input ports that can flash the firmware!)[/li]
[li]Receipts for the voters[/li]
[li]Low-power hardware with internal battery backup, so it can run for 8-10 hours with no utility power[/li]
[li]Write-once, read-many media for recording votes[/li][/ul]Chip H.
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