Providing an identity certificate is one thing.
Enrolling via SCEP or whatever other mechanism to actually get an identity certificate is something else.
Once upon a time, my laptop had an identity cert from the company CA issued to "people". Literally. One cert for everyone who's a "person".
Nowadays the cert is issued to my distinguished name - CN=kyle555,CN=Users,DC=tek-tips,DC=com and we have some protection software that we enter a PIN into that lets the cert be used for things.
So, for kicks, I exported my company's root CA certificate from the "Trusted Root CAs" in my PC and added it to a Server Profile on the SBC and required peer verification and trusted my company's CA.
I told One-X Communicator to use my identity cert and it popped the app that wanted my PIN to access my cert and it worked fine.
SCEP's good for hardware endpoints, even though to use SMGR's CA you'll need an entity created for every phone with their serial number or mac address. But for end users on PCs or mobiles, it's not like there's a SCEP client built in to Avaya's softclients to enroll. And that kind of makes sense in the context that an application, like voice and UC, should interop with best security practices but it's not there to be a managed PKI infrastructure for you.
All said and told, you could add a root CA cert to your SBC for mutual TLS and as long as the clients have a cert chained up to that CA, you can do mutual TLS.
If you're only dealing with Windows clients, then a group policy pushing an identity cert into the personal store is enough. If you've got mobile devices to manage, then some MDM like a Mobile Iron or IBM MaaS360 would let you install an identity cert on each mobile device and probably manage the enrollment to a CA they manage on your behalf - kinda like System Manager's CA but on steroids. Again, the difference being that Avaya's a phone system that happens to implement tight security with a minimal provisioning layer while the MDM solutions provide nothing but a best-in-class security provisioning layer around mobile devices.
Short story long, do your endpoint certs somewhere else. Install the identity certs on the endpoints and tell the SBC to trust the CA. Even without 2 way TLS, you've still got all sorts of things on the SBC like URI Groups in Subscriber Flows to reject anything that isn't exactly 7 digits@yourdomain.com and from User-Agent: Avaya One-X*. Further, DOS protections to reject >X registrations/min from a particular IP will weed out the garbage traffic from the public internet.
My role managing these SBCs doesn't permit me the luxury of dictating a client cert on all endpoints. As more and more solutions go cloud, a client certificate isn't acceptable as a requirement. I agree that it's the best way to shut down anyone you don't trust, but you're also opening up your service to an untrusted network. You should still have all the protections in place for DOS attacks and allowing only certain user-agents and URI schemes to pass through the SBC just in case I ever get a job at your company and get an identity certificate

.